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Abstract: Two agents convert resources into safety investment and production 
while exchanging goods voluntarily. Safety investment ensures reduction of 
costly risk. High unit cost of safety effort reduces both productive effort and 
safety effort, which reduces income. 
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Classical exchange theory was developed by Smith (1776) and Ricardo (1817). More 
recent accounts are Allen (2000), Arrow et al. (1961), Hausken and Moxnes (2005a, 
2005b) and Taylor (1993). Recently, exchange theory and conflict have been merged, 
accounting for production and fighting (see Anderton, 1999; Anderton et al., 1999; 
Bowles and Gintis, 1993; Hausken, 2004; Rider, 1999; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001). 
This article makes one step further accounting for safety investment in an exchange 
model. 
Safety risk has not received much attention in the economics literature.1  
Safety concerns are often considered as constraints imposed by law and regulations. 
Firms face risks due to internal factors related to production, equipment failure, human 
failure, due to interaction with other firms within the industry, or external factors. The 
latter can be societal changes in general, or targeted action such as crime, theft, 
espionage, hacking, blackmail, terrorism. Asche and Aven (2004) argue “that safety 
measures have a value in an economic sense”, and consider for one firm “the business 
incentives for investing into safety”. Similarly, Viscusi (1986) considers market 
incentives for safety. 
Recent changes in US accounting laws have made CEOs liable to legal malpractice if 
accounting information is found to be fraudulent. This has caused a certain panic among 
firms as to whether they should invest more in information assurance technologies, given 
that an increase in such investments could lead to a decrease in firms’ productivity. 
Firms, most of which have finite resource constraints, are thus naturally led to determine 
optimal investments in information assurance technologies versus production 
technologies. The former can be perceived as investment to reduce the risk of legal 
malpractice. This article intends to understand the factors that influence the trade-off 
between safety and productive investment during exchange. 
Each agent i can produce one good i, but also attaches utility to another good j,  
i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j. Agent i has a resource Ri (e.g., a capital good, or labour) which can be 
converted with unit conversion cost ai into productive effort Ei, and with unit cost bi into 
safety effort Si, where 
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The production cost coefficient ai, where 1/ai is the productive efficiency, measures the 
resources required to maintain the agent and machinery he uses in production. 
Analogously, 1/bi is the safety efficiency. As a practical aid, it may be convenient to 
think of good i as a consumption good such as oil, and the resource Ri as a capital good 
such as oil drilling equipment. Alternatively, the product may be a consumption good 
such as fish, and the resource Ri a capital good such as fishing nets. The productive effort 
Ei is designed to generate good i, i.e., extract income from resources currently employed. 
Without risk, the production function for good i or income Yi takes the simple form 
,hi iY E=  where h is the productivity parameter, with no need for safety effort 
[Hirshleifer, (1995), p.31]. With risk, the expected income is 
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where ci is a parameter that scales the safety effort relative to the risk ri. A large ci 
reduces the risk more efficiently. The risk function f(ri, Si) increases in the risk ri,  
∂f / ∂ri > 0, which reduces income, and decreases in the safety effort Si, ∂f / ∂Si <0, which 
constrains risk. The functional form is chosen for convenient analytical solutions. The 
agent can invest heavily in safety effort, which reduces the risk considerably, but that also 
reduces the production due to the budget constraint in (1). Hence, the agent faces a 
trade-off between Ei and Si. 
Agent 1 exports an amount X1 of good 1 to agent 2 in exchange for an amount X2 in 
return. The agents have equivalent Cobb-Douglas preferences for the two goods, with 
utilities 
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where α is the relative preference parameter for good 1 for both agents, and P2 is an 
interior terms-of-exchange price denoting the price of good 2 in terms of good 1. To 
determine the first order conditions, we let agent 1 choose E1 and X1, and agent 2 choose 
E2 and X2, simultaneously and independently, to maximise utility. This gives 
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Proposition 1: The productive effort Ei increases in the resource Ri and in the risk 
reduction efficiency ci, and decreases in both unit costs ai and bi, and in the risk ri. 
Proposition 2: The safety effort Si increases in the resource Ri and risk ri, and decreases 
in the unit cost bi of safety effort, and in ci. 
Proposition 3: The income Yi increases in the resource Ri and in ci, and decreases in both 
unit costs ai and bi, and in the risk ri. 
Especially interesting among these results is that high unit cost of safety effort reduces 
both productive effort and safety effort, and thus of course reduces income. Focusing on 
reducing bi is thus beneficial. We next insert 12 2 1X P X
−=  into the first equation in (3) 
and differentiate U1 with respect to X1, and thereafter insert 1 2 2X P X=  into the second 
equation in (3) and differentiate U2 with respect to X2. This gives 
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To determine the market equilibrium condition, inserting (5) into (3) gives the price 
equation 
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The price P2 of good 2 in terms of good 1 is determined endogenously on a 
supply-demand basis. When agent 1 acquires more resources (R1 increases), he produces 
more (Y1 increases), exports more (X1 increases), and the price P2 = X1/X2 increases. 
Conversely, when the relative preference parameter α for good 1 increases so that both 
agents attach higher utility to good 1 than to good 2, the demand for good 1 increases, 
causing a lower price P2 of the less valuable good 2 in terms of the more valuable good 1. 
Inserting (5) into (3) gives the utilities 
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Essential for the utilities is the agents’ preference α for goods. Agent 1 does better if 
good 1 is more preferred, and conversely if good 2 is preferred. 
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Notes 
1 See Calow (1998), Fischoff et al. (1981), and Jones-Lee (1989) for economic approaches to 
safety. Much literature focuses on public safety. See Feber et al. (2003) for the economic 
effects of road safety improvements, Swinbank (1993) for the economics of food safety, 
Thomas (1999) for economic and safety pressures on nuclear power, Rose (1990) for 
economic determinants of airline safety, Oi (1974, 1995) for the economics of product safety, 
Kotz and Schafer (1993) for economic incentives to accident prevention. 
